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Is a PoliticalCharacteran Essential
Element of the Law?

As is well known, numerous characteristics of law, especially in contemporary times, have been the object of intensive
and precise investigations to determine whether or not they
constitute essential elements of the law. For instance, the
* From the SrTuo iN ONORE Di AL0Rno DE GREGORiO. Translation by Louis Del
Duca, BA. Temple, LL.B. Harvard.
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imperativeness (i.e., the imposition of a duty), the bilateral
character (i.e., the relationship, between two personalities),
the coerciveness (the presence of sanctions which force an
individual to act in a given manner), the positive effectiveness, and the derivation of the law from the state** have
been investigated. It is now almost unanimously accepted
that the first two characteristics mentioned are essential elements of the law. Vigorous disputes still exist with regard to
the others. But we do not wish to discuss these disputes at this
time, because if we did we could not help repeating what we
have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere on these concepts.
It has recently been maintained that the law necessarily
possesses a political character. Professor Francesco Olgiati,
who is known and esteemed by every student of jurisprudence, is a particularly authoritative exponent of this doctrine.
In presenting his argument, Olgiati considers earlier writers,
and in particular St. Thomas Aquinas, who in his opinion
agreed with this thesis. Subsequently, the question was handled by various authors, who expressed extremely diverging
opinions on the matter. Therefore this argument is worth
considering, even though briefly. It will undoubtedly be of
interest to jurists since it concerns the logical concepts of law.
"The polis," states Olgiati, "is the end to which - indirectly or directly - law because of its intrinsic nature tends to
develop." ."The law forms and develops itself within the
political society, it grows and develops with this society." 2
But the concept of law, argues Olgiati, still referring to the
Thomistic doctrine, as well as the concept of the political
society, have as their end the bonum commune. Law is equivalent to justice and therefore law must refer itself to justice.
** Translator'sNote - The original Italian term used by Professor Del Vecchio
at this point was "statualita." This has been translated as "statuality." Del Vecchio,
On the Statuality of Law, XIX, 3d Series, JouRNAL or ComPARATmW LEGISLATION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (England 1937).
1 OLGITI, IL CONCErTO DI GumRrCITA IN SAN- ToMMAso D'AQumo 138 (2d ed.

1944).

2 Id. at 143.
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An unjust law, therefore, "non est lex, sed legis corruptio."
For the political society, polis, one must understand not a
society ordered in an indifferent manner, but a "societas perfecta" directed to achieving the common good. Political society, from his point of view, therefore, presupposes this final
or teleologic tendency (which is implicit in the relationship
between people) even if these relationships between people
precede the formation of states.
II - PoliticalJustice in the AristotelianDoctrine.
It is worth noting - even though Olgiati did not particularly consider this subject - that the doctrine of St. Thomas on
this argument reproduces to a large extent, and often translates ad litteram that of Aristotle. If, therefore, we analyze
the Aristotelian source, it will be easier to understand more
precisely the real significance of the doctrine.
Aristotle well understood that justice consists of a relationship between two or more persons; absolute justice, haplos
dikaion, denotes precisely this relationship in its purest and
most universal form. This form manifests itself positively in
the polis, that is in the State, where many men participate in
a community life as free and equal citizens. In this manner
one can distinguish the concept of political justice, politikon
dikaion, which Aristotle treats as similar to absolute justice,
haplos dikaion, establishing between them a certain correspondence.'
But, if for Aristotle political justice (or, as we would say,
the lIw of the State) represents the most perfect realization
of the ideal of justice, he admits nevertheless the existence of
other types of justice, in which the ideal of justice is less perfectly achieved. He notes for example, the right of a master
3 See ARISTOTLE, NcOMAcmAN ETmcs V. vi, 1134a 26. The two concepts, although closely related are however not identical. Cf. I HULENBRAND, GESCHICHTE
mN SYSTEM DER REC TS uxD STAATSPBJLOSOPHm 303 et seq. (1860); Fnomusi
LA DOTTIUNA DELLO STATO NELL 'ATIcHITA GRECA NEI SUOI RAPPORTI CON L'ETICA
85 (1873).
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over his slaves, despotikon dikaion, and of a father over his
children, patrikon dikaion, which together with marital rights
of a husband or wife constitute a type of law of domestic
relations, oikonomikon dikaion. The imperfections of these
types depend on the fact that in them there is a relationship
of subordination or belonging between one person and another, and not a coordinating relationship between two free
and equal persons. However, Aristotle recognized the existence of a juridical order distinct from the State's political
order in the family institution. Actually he maintained that
historically the family preceded the State.4 This corresponds
in substance to the findings of modern studies. Aristotle notes
that the union of a number of families gives birth to a village,
kome, and the union of a number of villages gives birth to the
State, polis. There is no doubt that this has a major importance in the Aristotelian system, because it responds to the
natural instinct of the human being, which is described by
the well known formula, politikon zoon. This does not mean
that according to Aristotle, every type of association or community has a political nature. However, these associations or
communities do have in all cases a certain law, that is to say
their own juridical order.5
These less important communities, in contrast to the political community, pursue particular ends, and are therefore in
some respects a subordinate part of the political order, which
seeks to organize the entire social life of the community.6 But
the common good, which should be the ultimate goal of this
social organization, is not always achieved. Actually it is not
even pursued by all political organizations, which degenerate
4 ARISTOTLE, PoLITIs I. ii, 1252a - 1252b. In another sense, not dealing with
the order of development of these organizations but with their teleologic significance,
Aristotle affirms instead the supremacy of the City-State over the individual. Id. at
1253a 20.
5 "En apase gar koinonia dokei ti dikaion einai." ARISTOTLE, NicoAc A
ETIr cs VIII. ix, 1159b 26.
6 Cf..id. at l160a 9.
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every time that rulers use their powers.to serve their own
selfish ends.
The explicit declaration of Aristotle on this point illustrates
how completely free his position was from the dogmatic
exaltation of the State, which was to appear later in other
philosophic systems. The various distinctions delineated by
Aristotle between natural justice, phusikon, and positive law,
nomikon; between the written law, gegrammenon, and the
unwritten law, agraphon, etc., also illustrates how extensive,
objective, and thorough his understanding of the complex
juridical phenomena was. This is further seen in his refusal
to reduce the definition of law to an oversimplified unilateral
formula such as that which maintains that the political sanction of the State is the necessary and exclusive element which
characterizes the law.' This is all the more significant, since
his observations evidently could not go beyond the reality of
his times, nor include types of juridical orders which are sui
generis, such as international and canon law, which were to
develop in a later age.
III -

The Doctrineof Saint Thomas Aquinas.

The Aristotelian doctrine was transmitted, as we indicated,
into the Thomistic system, even though this is based in its
more general premises on different principles which are essentially theological. The lex aeterna dominated the lex
naturalis,and this dominated the lex humana; the first (i.e.,
the lex aeterna) is the ratio divinae sapientiaewhich rules the
7 It is true that Aristotle declares that natural justice constitutes a part of
political justice, NrcoacHnAs ETHIcs V. vii, 1134b 19, but not in the sense that
the value of natural law is dependent on being recognized or sanctioned in the positive juridical order, but in the sense that the positive juridical order must of
necessity recognize natural law and achieve it, at least to some degree, even though
the positive law is subject to change. Aristotle thus attempts to account for the fact
that in the juridical systems of various nations there are certain similar parts and
others which are dissimilar. This is analgous to the later teachings of the Roman
jurists. However, Aristotle explicitly affirms that the laws of natural justice, precisely because they are founded on the laws of nature, are in themselves universally
valid above all human regulations or decrees. NrcomAcnmma
ETHIcS V. vii, 1134b
25-1135a 15.
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world; the second (i.e., lex naturalis) is the manifestation of
this rule in man limited by the capacity of his nature; the
third is an invention of man, by which the lex naturalis is
applied to specific situations in order to achieve the bonum
commune.8 However, St. Thomas, like Aristotle, expressly
considers the hypothesis that the man-made law departs to a
lesser or greater extent from this end. This man-made law,
in extreme cases therefore, ceases to be binding. Also here
then, we have no preconceived exaltation of the State nor of
the law which the State creates. Worth noting also is the fact
that St. Thomas distinguishes clearly the positive law in jus
gentium and jus civile,9 noting that the first stems directly
ex lege naturae, sicut conclusiones ex principiis; while the
second also derives from the natural law, but only according
to those principles which a State considers advantageous. The
rights of the people are therefore not dependent on the State.
This is sufficient to demonstrate that St. Thomas does not
consider the political sanctions of the State as an essential
element of the law. One might add, as several authoritative
interpreters of the Thomistic system note, that in addition to
the jus civile there is not only the jus gentium, but also that
of the Church: "the common division of human law is into
civil and ecclesiastical with regard to the two powers to which
the Christian world is subject, namely ecclesiastical and civil
power." "oTaking up and developing the Aristotelian theory
referred to above, Aquinas declares that justice has this
unique feature in comparison to other virtues, namely that
it regulates one man's relationship with another." Justice,
and therefore also the law which must seek to achieve justice,
8

ST. THOMAS, SummA TmEOLICoiA, I-II quaest 91-97.

9 Id. quaest 95, art. 4.
10 "Divisio communis legis humanae est in civilem et ecclesiasticam, ratione
duaram potestatum quibus orbis christiamus subjicitur, scilicet potestas ecclesiastica
et potestas civilis." 2 SUMMAE S. THOMAE 544 (Marietti ed., Billuart, 1940).
11 ". . . ut ordinet hominem in his quae sunt ad alterum." ST. THOMAS, SUMMA
TnEOLOGICA, II-II quaest 57, art. 1; quaest 58, art. 2.
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consists of a relationship between persons. This fundamental
concept has always remained incontrovertable because successive inquiries could only confirm it: sometimes illustrating
its various aspects in the light of experience, other times, by
using a deductive method, deepening its basic logical significance.
The many distinctions drawn by Aristotle in the field of
justice, namely among the various types of rights and law,
are generally conserved by St. Thomas; who however adds
others, in accord with the principles of his own system. For
instance, especially the jus divinum "quod divinitiis promulgatur." As St. Thomas explains in a passage perhaps not
sufficiently considered: 12
In part it consists of those things which are naturally just
(although man is incapable of understanding this justice); in
part it consists of those things which are made just by divine
ordinance. Therefore also divine justice as well as human
justice can be divided into these two.parts.
It is not worth pointing out the extent to which this concept
exceeds the limits of the State, and therefore those of the
political order.
If, however, the Aristotelian distinction between simpliciter justum (in which one finds a condition of party, as for
example when two persons are equally subservient to the
authority of the State) and the other type of justum, as the
paternum or dominativum (where one finds instead a predominance of one person over another 13), reappears in the
Thomistic system, a careful examination demonstrates that
such distinctions have much less importance in the Thomistic
system than in the Aristotelian system. The references to
12 "Partim est de his quae sunt naturaliter justa, sed tamen eorum justifia
homines latet; partim autem de his quae fiunta justa institutione divina. Unde efiam
jus divinum per haec duo distingul potest, sicut et jus humanum." Id. quaest 57, art.
2, reply 3.
13 See ST. TuOmAs, SUrmmA THEOLOGICA, II-I quaest 57, art. 4; quaest 58, art.
7, reply 3; I-IT quaest 114, art. 1; I quaest 85, art. 3, reply 2.
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politicum justum in relation to simpliciterjustum, are in the
works of St. Thomas purely incidental, and do not at all effect
the definition of the essential elements of justice and of law
which are elsewhere given by him without mention of the
political nature of law.
The observations and reservations which St. Thomas
makes apropos of the distinction previously indicated between politicum justum and simpliciterjustum are important.
They tend to limit the significance of this distinction. It is
clear that he admits the existence of various types of positive
law, also recognizing, as does Aristotle, that the civil or political law is more perfect than the law of domestic relations."
A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as such,
belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence
in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them
in a way....

But not even politicum justum constitutes, for St. Thomas,
the absolute archetype of justice, because it is subordinated to
the lex naturalis, which in turn is subordinated to the lex
aeterna. In substantiation of this, it is worth noting the fact
that St. Thomas, even though he followed the Stagirite, did
not utilize his formula (actually a little ambiguous) by which
the politikon dikaion would include natural justice, phusikon
dikaion, as one of its parts.
IV - JuristicCharacter(Giuridicita) and Positive
Characterof the Law.
The previous discussion permits us to conclude that a
political character is not an essential element of the law for
either Aristotle or St. Thomas. 5 Leaving aside the interpreta34
"Uterque tamen (filius et servus), prout consideratur ut quidam homo, est
aliquid secundum se subsistens ab aliis distinctum. Et ideo inquantum uterque est
homo, aliquo modo ad eos est justitia." ST. THOmAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, IMIl
quaest 57, art. 4, reply 2.
15 To sustain his opposing interpretation of the thought of St. Thomas, Olgiati
cites LACHANCE, LE CONCEPT DE DROIT SELoN ARISTOTE ET S. THo As (1833). In this
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tion of these authors, we will now directly consider the problem in its logical aspects.
No one can deny that (as was already amply demonstrated) all juridical propositions imply and denote a coordination of the actions possible between several subjects.
This coordination enables one of the subjects to act in a
certain manner, without meeting opposition from another.
We are dealing therefore with an interpersonal relationship,
in which rights correspond to obligations. This simple scheme
would exist even if only two persons existed on the earth, or
else, for example, on an island; and even if only one person
existed who thought of himself as being in a possible relationship with another person. In another work I have made clear
that such a contraposition of the ego to alterego is not something accidental, but it is an epistemological necessity, that is,
a true category of our intellect. 6
The logical scheme of the juridical order does not have,
strictly speaking, any other requisites than those previously
indicated. It includes all the possible activities of several subjects. These activities are the concrete manifestations of this
logical scheme. They can be merely ideal or hypothetical, or
also positive; but on this point a little discussion will be
useful.
work however, in addition to the political element of the law, other characteristics
of law are discussed. Lachance'insists, for example, that, ". . . the political community, like every perfect organism, must in itself be composed of heterogenous
parts, on the one hand of diversified organs, of private associations of natural cells
and elementary principles on the other." LACHANCE, supra at 290. He continues,
"And everything else which has direct reference to society has a complete life and
a whole purpose of its own, which life it presupposes and which it calls upon the
natural and private associations to furnish." According to his point of view, ....the
three elements which integrate the notion of law and right are properly and
intrinsically contained in secondary forms of law." LACH"CE, supra at 291. It
therefore does not seem to us that the thinking.of Lachance is completely in accord
with that of Olgiati. One notes, for example, how Lachance considering the various
types of law attributes a political character only to some of them. LACEANCE, supra
at 322.

16 For further discussion of this subject, see DFL VicCo~O, LA' Guisri
seq. (4th ed. 1951).

81 et.
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The affirmation of one's subjective self and the recognition
of another's subjectivity are elements which arise and develop necessarily in every conscience; which is to say that
law develops naturally from the human spirit. Just as human
life can develop itself only via a series of intersubjective
relations, so the data of individual consciences, even if they
are not in all respects similar, arrange themselves in such a
manner as to produce a type of average result which constitutes the positive law of each people. This law which is
constantly reintegrating and readapting itself is subject historically to a certain variability because of the perennial
vitality of its sources, while at the same time it tends to
assume a coherent structure in the process of becoming a
functioning system.
One should conclude from this that the positive nature of
law - which must not be confused with the juridical nature
of law - is something which involves diverse stages of development. The process of forming positive law is extremely
complicated, especially since the product of the individual
conscience manifests itself not only in the general system of
laws of an entire population, but also in the laws of minor
social organizations, of which every individual is a part.
Nothing is more contrary to the truth than the prejudice,
still found amongst jurists, which maintains that only one
juridical order, namely that of the State, exists, and that all
law emanates from the State. The truth of the matter is that
juridical orders develop in multiple forms wherever human
life exists, and that the State is only the order, amongst the
many juridical orders, which because it is a manifestation of
the preponderant social will, has achieved the highest degree
of effectiveness. The minor juridical orders, which do not
regulate the entire life of their members, but only some
aspects of it, often insert themselves in the preponderant
juridical order, and in this manner become a part of it while
retaining their own sphere of autonomy. However, cases of
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divergence and complete autonomy do occur. For example,
the minor social units may not wish to or may not be able to
act in accordance with the norms imposed by the juridical
order of the State.
Social and juridical phenomena are in this respect so vast
and rich that it is impossible to describe them adequately
even in rough outline in such a brief work as this. We will
only observe a few of the characteristic aspects, that is, some
of the forms in which the juridical productivity of the individual manifests itself within and sometimes contrary to the
juridical order of the State. One should not be misled by the
fact that such a production (actually autonomous), on coming in contact with other juridical orders which are already
well established, often accommodates itself to these orders
and thus appears to be created by them. Such is the case of
the customs which growing independently of legislative norms
are subsequently recognized by legislative norms. Such is the
case of domestic and family law, especially of the power of
the pater jamilias which without doubt assumed its general
characteristics long before a system of norms was imposed by
the State. However, even more noteworthy is the tendency
currently observable to form professional organizations;
unions, corporations, etc., with their own juridical orders
which, as regards their by-laws that are not in conflict with
the laws of the State, are not subordinate to the authority of
the State, nor do they obtain their authority from the State.
An open conflict between various political orders is thus
apparent. This conflict, in the course of historical evolution,
can and must in some manner resolve itself. It nevertheless
illustrates the possibility of a legal order not derived from
the State.
As is already apparent, the gregarious tendency which
exists in man (that which Grotius calls appetitus societatis)
can manifest itself simultaneously in different organizations,
creating amongst these a network of complicated relation-
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ships, in which the less important organizations develop within
the framework of the more important organizations. Rousseau expressed the idea well when he stated that, "All political
society is composed of other and lesser societies of a particular
nature, none of which has the same interests and principles as
the political society itself." " Undoubtedly each society or
organization has its own order, that is to say each lives
according to prescribed rules, written or unwritten. Chaos
rather than society would exist without these rules. Even
when these rules are derived from a larger and more potent
organization such as the national state a certain juridical
productivity nonetheless manifests itself to such a degree
within the limits of power of the minor organizations that one
can conclude that the life of a social organism is never completely passive in this respect. Often social and juridical
,orders are formed spontaneously and independently of every
preceding system, and even revolt directly against the juridical system of the State.
It is obvious, that in such a case the State will certainly
declare such an organization illegal; but this illegality is
merely relative, that is to say it is effective only from the
point of view of the particular state making the declaration
of illegality. Objectively speaking, however, a certain legality
must be recognized in these organizations in so far as imperative and intersubjective norms exist in the relationships between the constituents of the organizations.
We are aware of the fact that this thesis provokes opposition, especially for sentimental reasons. However, we must
observe facts and analyze them with rigorous logic without
being influenced by any prejudice. "Non ridere, non lugre,
neque detestari, sed intelligere," states the admonition of
Spinoza. Value judgments can be and should be objects of
another investigation (deontological) but certainly must not
17

ROUSSEAU, De l'Economic politique.
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effect investigations which seek to discover the characteristics
of the species observed.
Precisely in order not to evaluate in a prejudiced manner
the diverse juridical structures, it is necessary not to confuse
this evaluation with a statement of the elements which go
into the making of a juridical order. It is not scientifically
correct to make summary judgments of merit or non-merit,
when one is merely attempting to discover whether or not a
given characteristic is a necessary element of the law.
Let us admit also that in the majority of cases the social
organizations declared "illegal" by the State are directed towards dishonest and reproachable ends; and let us admit also
that in the majority of cases the activity of the State is
directed towards the attainment of justice. But this, at least
in the philosophic camp, must be ascertained by reason and
not merely on the basis of a simple prejudice which assumes
that the entire organization of the State is always directed
towards the attainment of justice, and conversely that all
organizations which oppose the State should be condemned.
In the presence of a tyrannical state, secret organizations may
have the highest ethical value (one thinks for example of the
Mazzinian Young Italy; and it is superfluous to cite other
recent examples); while they may also have an internal
legality, with autonomous attributes of power and of rights
and duties in the relationships of their members.
On careful examination one notes that that which distinguishes the State from minor organizations existing in its
midst is not a higher degree of ethical perfection - which
probably may be so in the majority of cases, but is not always.
the case. Actually the distinguishing factor as we have already noted is its greater effectiveness vis-a-vis other organizations, which themselves become states or organs of state
when they acquire this preponderant effectiveness. The minor
degree of effectiveness which these organizations possess does
not signify a lesser degree of legality, giuridicita,since this
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formal characteristic does not depend on the real efficiency
of the norm, but only on its logical significance.
V-

JuridicalOrders ExistingIndependently of the
State'sPoliticalOrder.

Autonomous organizations may exert authority in an area
not within the limits of State authority and also include individuals who are citizens of diverse states or stateless persons. In this area the juridical phenomena are also extremely
varied. However, it is not necessary to pause here to consider
the diverse types of associations, national and international,
which often have little importance.
There is, however, a vast organism of great spiritual significance which merits attention even at the end of our study.
I refer to the Catholic Church. The Church is certainly not a
state, but it nevertheless has its own juridical order with its
own Code and magistrates. Its authority, civil and penal, is
exercised over all the faithful, in a sphere of competence
which exceeds that of the single states which are represented
in the Church. How could we, without obvious error, deny
the juridical nature of the norms of the Canon Law or attribute to it a political nature which could minimize or alter
its significance?
There is another juridical system which is not identified
with that of any state which we cannot overlook. This is the
system of international lw. The norms of which international
law consists are derived partially from agreements between
various states, but they have a more profound root in the
natural uniformity of the human mind. It is useful to note
that the validity of agreements voluntarily concluded are
based on a principle of natural reason, which cannot be the
result of these agreements, precisely because it is the presupposition on which all agreements must be based. In remote
ages this principle was, without doubt, spontaneously felt
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and reduced to custom. Other norms regulating war and
peace amongst nations also have an equally spontaneous
origin. The absence of a corresponding political unity has not
prevented the formation of such a system, whose juridical
nature cannot be denied, regardless of its lack of positive
effectiveness, if one considers its ultimate end.
VI-

The Productionof JuridicalNorms by the
IndividualConscience.

To distinguish the logical form of the law from its contingent manifestations certainly does not mean to ignore the
importance of these manifestations, especially that of the
State which predominates over others because of its greater
effectiveness. For organs of the State it is obvious that other
coexisting systems are not valid unless they are recognized
by the State. Such an observation is equally true for all other
organizations. This is the abstract and dogmatic solution of
a problem, which in concrete reality assumes an extremely
more complex aspect, because of a series of interactions
amongst norms of various kinds, origins, and effectiveness.
Let us not forget that in the life of the law there is a
fundamental factor, inexhaustible and always active. I refer
to the individual conscience from which the norms of systems
of law which are in force are derived, and which maintains
its insuppressable autonomy even vis-a-vis these prevailing
systems of law. This autonomy is exercised, within narrow
limits, in the act of interpreting existing rules when their
meaning must be determined in the context of specific factual
situations, at which point the basic or fundamental source of
the law must be considered. But this autonomy is exercised
in a much greater degree when the individual mind, according
to its innate faculties, conceives norms diverse from those
currently in force to be more just. Those who are attached
to the positive school refuse to consider these conceived
norms as constituting a part of the legal order. However, we
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do not know to what other category such conceived norms
should be relegated, if not to that which has as its base the
logical form of law. Therefore'we do not hesitate to ascribe
to these conceived norms the designation of law even though
they do not possess a positive nature. A majority vote might
confer this characteristic on these norms, but it would not
confer a juridical character on them. This juridical characteristic, la giuridicita,is dependent solely on the intrinsic significance of the norm. For the same reason an abrogated law does
not become an economic, religious, moral or any other type
of norm, but conserves its juridical nature even though it has
lost its vigor.
It is hardly necessary to caution that in affirming the
common nature of positive and non-positive law, we do not
intend in the least to repudiate the authority of the former,
nor to place the obligation of observing the positive law at
the mercy of any or all subjective value judgments. This
obligation has profound reason supporting it, which we need
not repeat here. Also unjust laws must, in general, be respected by those who hope for reform. Only in extreme cases
does the obligation to respect the established order cease. The
problem which now presents itself is of another nature. Just
as positive legislation varies, so too the determination of the
just and the unjust formed by the individual conscience may
be a little varied. The same logical form in fact permits a
changeable content. The variations are easily explained
partially because the law, absolute in principle, must nevertheless adapt itself to the particular circumstances to which
it must be applied, partially because the human spirit is continually developing over a series of stages of perfection, and
partially because the human mind is not infallible, and errors
are possible in this as in every other subject.
If, however, deviations have occurred, as is undoubtedly
true, also in the development, "elaborazioni spontanee", of
the individual conscience attempting to achieve justice, one
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must recognize that such deviations were, in general, less
numerous and less grave that those which occurred amongst
the positive law jurists. It is well known that in the area of
positive law not only opposing interests but also diverse and
often violent passions are stimulated, while in the speculative
field the search for natural justice is accomplished by rules
according to the formula of Tomasius "ex ratiocinatione
animi tranquilli."
Some simple but fundamental maxims of justice or of
natural law were already discovered, as was noted, by ancient
philosophy. The same maxims reaffirmed and strengthened
by Christianity were later developed by the ius naturae
schools, which, despite various disputes and certain methodological imperfections, maintained firmly the noble idea of a
universally valid law founded on natural principles and therefore superior to the arbitrary decisions of governing bodies.
In this manner a true system of rights belonging to a human
being precisely because he is a human being, and not because
these rights are conferred on him by the State, was formed.
In effect, these rights were considered as the presupposition
of the State itself. This philosophical conception later passed
from the purely doctrinal to the political field, becoming the
program not only of progressive reform, but also of insistent
demands and revolution in the most critical moments of
modern history. The triumph of that program was such that
it was transmitted, as fundamental documents, into the constitutions of the more advanced states; and it is not an
exaggeration to state that the world today considers the
positive recognition of the natural rights of man as an intangible conquest where they have been so recognized. In those
parts of the world where they have not yet been recognized,
they are considered a goal which must necessarily be reached.
The prejudices of certain schools, which because of a narrow positivism oppose the admission of natural law as a
necessary and scientifically legitimate idea, thus receive from
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the facts themselves the most severe contradiction. It is also
fair to note that even from the heart of the positive school,
contradicting its original premises, a voice has sometimes
arisen in defense of the concept of natural law. Such, for
example, is the case of Spencer, who in his work entitled
Justice, has outlined a system of natural rights similar to that
previously outlined by the rationalist school.
If one understands the real significance of this idea as a
part of the order of values of which the supreme reality is
composed, he will recognize in it a perfect type of juridical
order, prior in existence and superior to every political or
state order. In the majority of cases in relation to this concept, the positive manifestation of the law represents only a
consecutivum.
VII

-

Criticism of the Thesis of the Political
Characterof Law.

From the preceding discussion it should be sufficiently clear
that a political character, l'elemento della politicita, is not an
essential element of the law. Even if we do not wish to discuss
the controversial problem of natural law, there are, within
positive law, relationships and systems of law which possess
the logical characteristics of a juridical order without constituting a political entity.
It does not seem necessary to refute in extenso the contrary opinion, which is maintained principally, as we noted,
by Professor Olgiati, partially because such'a refutation is
already implicit in the preceding considerations, partially also
because, if this point of view had some adherents,1 8 it also
Is For example, Di Carlo states: "It seems to me that one can devise a doctrine
of the political nature of law which is contained in its just terms without reference
to any excessive or improper language." S. ToMAsso D'AQUINO, STrMA TmoLoGiCA
(La guistizia, II-I1 quaest 57-61) 34 (Lumia's transl. 1950). Other scholars have
tended to agree with him. Nirchio, Book Review, 20 SoPnIA 82, 83 (1952); Zampetti, Book Review, 43 REvISTA ni FiLosoiA NEO-SCHOASTICA 266, 267 (1951).
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had some critics to whom we shall refer the reader "9even
though we do not completely agree with them.
Let us consider several points which in our opinion have
not yet been adequately considered.
In the presence of facts which demonstrate how a juridical
order can exist also in the absence of a polis or State, Olgiati
attempts to defend his thesis, by maintaining that the political character of law is a tendency rather than an existing
fact. "The polis," he states, "is the end towards which directly or indirectly,- law, because of its intrinsic nature,
tends to develop." 20 He adds,2
What difference does it make if at the dawn of civilization
only Adam and Eve existed? Even the primordial ancestors,

at a time when the state could obviously not have been in
existence were naturaliter oriented towards the societas and
towards the future social organizations, as the seed is ultimately
oriented towards the plant and the forest.... The relationships

between two persons must not and never can be thought of as
existing prior to this political orientation.

We readily recognize the ingenuity of this argument; but we
must also state that with such an argument the meaning of
the words used becomes uncertain and the scope of our problem is changed. If, as the same author admits, "Law existed
before states were formed"; 22 and if interpersonal relationships having the characteristics of a juridical order existed
19 GRANERsS, CONTRLBUTI TomisTici ALLA FioSOrIA DEL DnRTTo 43 et seq.
(1949); Battaglia, Recensione di F. Olgiati, [April-Dec. 1947] RmVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRRITTo 258-263; Corti, B' la politicita la nota
essenziale del diritto?, 72 LA SCUOLA CATT LICA 58-68 (1944); Levi, La giurdicita
nella Filosofia tomistica eneo-tornistica,[Jan.-March 1947] Riv=STA IxTERNAzioNAXE
DI FrrosoxrA DEL DmiTro 81-88; Messineo, Ii concetto di giuridicita, [1943] 4 LA

CIVITA CATTOLICA 317-321. Olgiati has replied to some of these critics, repeating his
thesis without modification, but in a dearer manner. He writes: "So far as I am
concerned, there is an identity of right and justice, and justice in turn connotes a
political element." OLGIATI, INDAGII z DiscuSSIONI INTORNO At. CONCFrrO DI
GruRiDIciTA 61 (1944).
20 OLGIA~i, IL CONcETTO DI GmruiolciTA iN

1944).
21 Id. at 151-152.
22 Ibid.

S.TomAsso

D'AQu-no 138 (2d ed.
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when no political organization was yet in existence, then we
cannot correctly maintain that the concept of politically
sanctioned norms must be included in our definition of law.
We must not confuse the intrinsic end of a given relationship
with the end which it actually achieves because of contingent
factors. Actually all interpersonal relationships do not have
as their end the State. Neither do they necessarily tend to
orient themselves towards the State's political order. In response to Olgiati's analogy one notes that the truth of the
matter is that not all seeds produce a forest; and that no
botanist would claim that a seed had to be defined in terms
of its capacity to produce forests.
Olgiati next considers the medieval guilds, Gewerkschaften,
and admits that their norms were juridical although they
were not imposed by the State. Nevertheless, he wants to
recognize even in these professional organizations a political
character, for the reason that they had "an ultimate relationship to the life of the State", because "the sense of civitas,
of a collective body unifying the energy of individuals..." 23
was so highly valued in those times. This reasoning is a little
vague. The political nature of the organization should result
from its own functioning and not from a mere distant relationship which is not clearly defined.
With regard to international law, Olgiati, after recognizing
its juridical nature, attempts to demonstrate its political
character in the following manner. He argues that States, 4
...are individual entities ultimately subject as a matter of
natural law, to a superior and supreme body, which, when it
shall truly include all of the States of the world shall constitute
the polis par excellence.

We agree with this; but note that although this polis does
not yet exist, international law does exist.
23
24

Id. at 157.
Id. at 156.
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VIII -

The Ideal of Justice and JuridicalRealism.

It is useful to state at this point some general conclusions
which result from the previous discussion.
The Aristotelian doctrine of the State, like the Platonic,
reflects the common belief of the Greeks that the polis was
the supreme reality "suprema realta." Only in this manner
can we explain certain theories which depict the city-states
as perfect associations and the perfect actualization of the
ideal of justice. However, when these formulas are received
and reconsidered in the Thomistic System, they assume a
different significance because they have been inserted into a
broader setting, in which other principles are dominant.
Above the lex humana there exists, in the Thomistic System
the lex naturalis, and above this is the lex aeterna or divine
law. It is true that natural law is a part of the Aristotelian
System; but it possesses a much more important position in
the Thomistic System. Especially in so far as it connects itself
with an even higher law, which was ignored by Aristotle,
namely, the divine law. It is sufficient to remember in this
regard the explicit declaration of St. Thomas according to
which citizens have the right and the duty not to obey the
laws of the State when they impose obligations contrary to
natural or divine law.
One also observes from this how justice is not in the Thomistic System as strictly allied to the State as it is in the
Aristotelian system. Without doubt, St. Thomas also affirms
(and who could deny it?) that the purpose of the State must
be to achieve the bonum commune; but this end is considered
as an ideal of a deontological character, instead of a fact
which is necessarily found in all States. Even Aristotle had
already, as we have previously noted, referred to such a
distinction.
The clarifications made on all of this subject by juridical
and philosophical investigations of the succeeding centuries,

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

and especially of the latest, and also the evidence supplied by
new historical experiences are so precise and mark such an
evident progress, that it seems to us that they cannot be
ignored even if we retain the maximum respect for the ancient
classic doctrines.
In the past ages the concept of law was identified with that
of Justice. One cannot say that such an identification of the
two which reappears also today in some theories is completely erroneous, because the two notions have a similar
basis, and may also sometimes coincide. However, a more
profound analysis completed by philosophers and jurists has
demonstrated that the logical form of the law includes all the
possible types of juridical reality, and not only that perfect
type which is called Justice. This constitutes then a model
and an ideal criterion, which enables us to evaluate all norms
which belong to the logical form of the law.
Distinguishing in such a manner the reality from the ideal
of the law makes possible the solution of problems otherwise
almost insolvable. It also satisfies the logical and ethical
needs of the human mind. On the contrary, the attempt to
satisfy these diverse needs together with a single formula,
must encounter an obstacle because of their diversity. Noble,
without doubt, was the aim pursued by some great writers,
declaring that "lex injusta non est lex"; but no jurist will
refuse to consider as law juridical determinations which have
all the formal requisites of law because they appear defective
in the light of the supreme idea of justice. No jurist will ever
consent, for example, to excluding the institution of slavery
from the system of classic Roman law, though (as is recognized as a matter of fact by the same Roman jurists) it
obviously contradicts the principles of natural law, according
to which all men are equally free.
If one notes carefully, the principle of justice, or of natural
law, reveals itself in a much purer form in its ideal validity,
ideale validita, in so far as it detaches itself from its strong
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attachment with the positive law. The positive law often
differs from the just law. It nevertheless must be studied
objectively in its specific manifestations (as positive law),
regardless of how far it deviates from the ideal law.
Far from considering in a dogmatic fashion positive law
as being synonymous with justice, we regard the positive law
as being essentially subordinated to the valuation of what
it can accomplish in achieving justice. Our conscience refuses
to accept any fact which cloaks itself in the mantle of legality,
but simultaneously refuses also to preclude the perception of
such types of facts, precisely in order to be able to exercise
over them a higher judgment in the province of pure reason.
The definition given by a hopeful and we might say almost
ingenuous optimist, which generically attributes to the positive law and the State an absolute value, is immediately
contradicted when subjected to a rational analysis and the
test of history in every age. We believe to be inexact the
doctrines which maintain that the law is always determined
by particular interests or classes, and that the State is merely
a multitude of people wherein "the strongest impose their
will on the weakest." 25 Neither do we believe the opposing
theories to be acceptable, which, with an equally arbitrary
generalization, assert that "the common good and the law
are two inseparable notions," 26 or else they attribute to every
state the extremely ambiguous character of the "ethical
State."
If, in place of these opposing dogmatic views, we follow
what we consider to be the correct method, we shall equally
abstain from summarily exalting all States and likewise from
condemning all anti-State or illegal organizations. It is useless
to state that we share the dislike of Olgiati for criminal associations; 2 but this feeling must be the result of reason when
25

1 DUGuiT, TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 655 (3d ed. 1927).

26
27

See OwismT, op. cit. supra note 20, at 144.
Id. at 148. Cf. STuRzo, LA SOCIETA SUA NATURA E LaGGi 245 et seq. (1949).
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we are passing judgment on such phenomena. In so judging
we should not forget that quite frequently, especially by
despotic governments, all opposition was characterized as
criminal, sometimes for reasons which were not clearly blameworthy. In order to understand well the true nature of these
phenomena one must above all retain his objectivity. If in
many cases we also find in organizations declared illegal by
the State, a system of imperative and bilateral norms which
assign to its members correlative rights and obligations, we
must not hesitate to attribute to them the formal character of
law. At the same time, the legal order of these supposedly
completely illegal organizations may possess a certain degree
of justice, especially regarding its internal relationships. At
this point the observation of Plato comes to mind, according
to which justice amongst men is so necessary, that even robbers and thieves in their association with one another must
observe certain principles of justice in order to achieve their
common goal.28
To him who considers the political order as being synonymous with justice, or as being an inseparable part of justice,
we must finally object that not only the society of thieves
but also that of states has frequently perpetrated injustices.
We would go so far as to say that perhaps no delinquent or
group of delinquents have ever so thoroughly offended the
most elementary and inviolable principles of justice as the
Nazi state did, for example, with its infamous racial laws and
the inhuman manslaughter which followed them.
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